“the exact same meaning for God, for Christ, and for man”.Do
“the identical meaning for God, for Christ, and for man”.Do not such declarations signify a surrender of phenomenology to (crypto)theology, suggested, in addition to others, by Dominique Janicaud, who counts Henry in his polemical essay on the “theological turn” amongst the “new theologians” So as to adequately counter this all too sweeping charge and in the end to become able to create the important implications of Henry’s position for any pondering of culture and politics, we must envision what is at play in his transformation of phenomenology into a “phenomenology of life” it concerns, to foreshadow this crucial point of his discourse, the transcendental humanitas of human beings, our inescapable destiny to be a Self, some thing that is definitely itself given in its “living flesh” devoid of owing its singularity to any sort of transcendent principle, but that NS-398 generally finds itself exposed for the seductions of transcendence, that is, by the attempt to define itself by signifies of a transcendent principle.That and how such an unfathomable singularity is at play in our cultural and political selfunderstanding is shown in Michel Henry’s sensible writings.Turning phenomenology on its head from intentional to “material” phenomenology For Henry, the popular presupposition that links classical philosophy with historical phenomenologyfrom Husserl and Heidegger to MerleauPonty and Levinas consists inside the reality that they assume the logos of phenomena as the logos on the planet.To place it a different way, they all believe appearing as horizontal appearing.For this reason, Henry believes, they’re not capable of explaining how intentionality brings itself forth, which is, how transcendence is in a position to transcend itself.To be able to solve this issue it can be necessary to go back to the immemorial ground of encounter, in which, as Henry puts it, intentionality takes possession of itself, or, rather, “experiences rouve soimeme).Only in such a way of mainly giving itself to itself is it itself” (s’e Janicaud (pp).Henry (a, p).Janicaud (pp).The debates regarding the status of the “turn” amongst new French phenomenologists was unquestionably marked by a polemical tone.This polemic was not within the least conditioned by Janicaud’s own commentary and position of “minimalist phenomenology,” that is faithful to Husserl’s phenomenological rigor, and certainly so in this really book.Janicaud himself requires an intercessional position around the diverse replies to the “theological turn” in an elaborate and thorough way in omenologie e late (Janicaud).On this debate and Janicaud’s method in specific, see La phe Gondek and Tengelyi .Henry (pp).I should note that I can’t take into consideration Michel Henry’s significant operate on Marx (Henry), that is relevant here.See Henry (p).M.Staudiglalso capable of transcending itself and moving towards the other.For Henry, the job of a radical, i.e “material phenomenology” thus consists in returning to “pure immanence” and its inner “structure” and “dynamic.” Against the “ontological monism” of Western philosophy, i.e the presupposition that “phenomenological distance will be the ontological energy which gives us access to items,” such a phenomenology thematizes the “duplicity of appearing.” This implies that against manifestationwhich is Henry’s term for all transcendent, ecstatic, or worldly appearingis pitted a pure appearing or, to be additional precise, a selfappearing PubMed ID:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21317601 or autorevelation.The idea of duplicity underscores the fact that this d.